Choreography, they say, does not replace articulation; therefore bees cannot be said to have a syntax.

talkinganimals.jpg

I’ve been read­ing a lit­tle about ani­mal cog­ni­tion and com­mu­ni­ca­tion (Shh­hhh, its research!). The mys­tery of “what goes on inside” an elephant’s head is not really what inter­ests me; it’s what ani­mals reveal about the rela­tion­ship of per­cep­tion, lan­guage and knowl­edge. If lan­guage is what we use to seg­ment and inform the con­tin­uum of our per­cep­tions, then lan­guage is knowl­edge (and knowl­edge is lan­guage) and the knowl­edge of ani­mals must be very, very for­eign. Learn­ing about non-human life forms con­tin­u­ally con­firms my sus­pi­cions: (1) We aren’t shaped by lan­guage, we are lan­guage (what­ever lan­guage that may be), and (2) Many of us have aliens liv­ing in our own homes.

Wittgen­stein gave us this famous ver­dict on ani­mal lan­guage and con­scious­ness: “If a lion could talk, we would not under­stand him.” Some peo­ple think he was say­ing that ani­mals can’t have lan­guage as advanced as our own. I think he was say­ing that lions have dif­fer­ent per­cep­tual appa­ra­tus, and a dif­fer­ent sym­bol­ogy, so even if a lion could com­mu­ni­cate in Eng­lish, or sign lan­guage, the words and metaphors it would draw upon would fol­low a com­pletely dif­fer­ent logic. This is exactly why I have always been freaked out by the idea of pets. We’re so casual about hav­ing ani­mals live with us, and strangely con­fi­dent that all our one-sided con­ver­sa­tions are pen­e­trat­ing them just as they would a baby, or a mute uncle. Yet ani­mals, so long as we don’t speak their lan­guage, should silence us like con­tem­pla­tion of the galaxies.

Think of all the pic­tures of cats on the web. No mat­ter how much we learn about their bod­ies and brains, no mat­ter how much we live and inter­act with them, they remain icons, or sym­bols, or some­thing. We gaze at them like stars and pred­i­cate their mean­ing and iden­tity with our own image.

The ques­tions that haunt us are: Do they under­stand me? Do they appre­ci­ate beauty? Do they have mem­o­ries? Do they make mean­ing? Do they have any­thing at all like story and nar­ra­tive? Do they dif­fer­en­ti­ate right and wrong? As this line of ques­tion­ing con­tin­ues, it becomes more and more obvi­ous that the answer is no. Well, at least not like that, right? The prob­lem is we have no idea how to phrase the ques­tions so they even make sense in the con­text of a dolphin’s expe­ri­ence (or an ant’s, or a rabbit’s, or a dinosaur’s, or a blue jay’s).

We know that ani­mals can see, hear, smell, taste, touch and feel; we imag­ine that they think, rea­son, and abstract from their own his­to­ries of sen­sory infor­ma­tion. We try and put our­selves inside a dog’s col­or­blind, scent-swamped, ear-pricked expe­ri­ence, mar­veling at how dif­fer­ently they see the world. But it’s not as though we could sim­ply heighten and dampen cer­tain senses and brain capac­i­ties and arrive at a dog’s inter­pre­ta­tion of the world. It’s not as if the world is a fixed text, or dataset, seen from var­i­ous angles, or inter­preted through dif­fer­ent lenses, which we can com­pare and con­trast. It is dynamic, exist­ing in rela­tion­ship and process.

Remem­ber tri­ads? All of our infor­ma­tion comes to us via “a coop­er­a­tion of three sub­jects”: sign, object, and inter­pre­tant. Accord­ing to Charles Pierce, as quoted in this essay, “this tri-relative influ­ence” is not “in any way resolv­able into actions between pairs.” It’s not just the world and it’s inter­preters, there are these lit­tle guys called signs–the words and sym­bols we use to com­mu­ni­cate our perceptions–aiding and inter­fer­ing. The “tri-relative world” exists in the inter­face. Ani­mal signs and sign-functions are not like our own. And with this bril­liant ker­nel of evi­dence *wink*, I sug­gest that ani­mals do not live on Earth, as we know it: they are aliens on plan­ets that may as well be light years away.

Thomas Sebeok, the semi­oti­cian who applied sign study to the study of evo­lu­tion of life sys­tems, and pop­u­lar­ized Biosemi­otics, believed that “semi­o­sis [or sign behav­ior] must be rec­og­nized as a per­va­sive fact of nature as well as of cul­ture.” “The sig­nif­i­cance cir­cuit,” as Sebeok calls it in his essay, “The Sign Sci­ence and The Life Sci­ence,” is “based on con­struc­tion by the observer-participancy of some carbon-based life.” Ani­mal, veg­etable, mineral–each the locus of its Umvelt. Not ves­sels of com­mu­ni­ca­tion, trans­mit­ting infor­ma­tion and receiv­ing knowl­edge, but com­mu­ni­ca­tion itself, con­sti­tut­ing what is seen, known and understood.

Mostly, I just I love the way we talk about our fur­rier friends, attribut­ing cun­ning and emo­tion, and imag­in­ing inner mono­logues.

8 Responses to “Choreography, they say, does not replace articulation; therefore bees cannot be said to have a syntax.”


  • woah, good topic. have you watched the dog whis­perer? dog psy­chol­ogy. yeah, ani­mal per­cep­tion seems so for­eign, like the absence of moral fram­ing, my mom’s cat is walk­ing around chas­ing a fly right now. cesar mil­lan talks about dogs’s incred­i­ble abil­ity to live com­pletely in the moment. or orangutans’s uncanny flash mem­ory, i saw this thing where a mon­key plays a mem­ory game and TOTALLY kicks every lit­tle kid’s ass.

  • I can see how ani­mals, between each other, have a lan­guage all their own. And my cat is def­i­nitely an alien, but what about ani­mals mak­ing human-like sounds? Like par­rots imi­tat­ing. Do they do it to please us or get us to do some­thing for them? Or just because they can?

    When our cat Sprout wants to go out­side or eat, she will stand by her food or the door and make a meow­ing noise that is more like a human voice than a nor­mal meow. It is shorter and more gut­tural. Do you think ani­mals will try to mimic humans the way they mimic other ani­mals (e.g. star­lings, mock­ing­birds, etc.)? I think ani­mals kind of do and in the same way we mimic them to get them to come to us.

  • like the absence of moral framing”

    totally.

    cesar mil­lan is rad. ani­mal cog­ni­tion is such a hot topic these days, and i think he is a pretty amaz­ing intro­duc­tion to the real ques­tions of the field for most people.

  • Ariel–
    I think mim­icry is where humans and ani­mals begin to build some sort of shared lan­guage based on com­mon envi­ron­ment. Humans and ani­mals can cer­tainly learn to under­stand signs that the other makes–is this the same as under­stand­ing each other’s lan­guage? I think it’s a new rela­tion­ship between sounds or sig­nals and cer­tain shared objects that nec­es­sar­ily involve the other (human or ani­mal). Also, each ani­mal is dif­fer­ent, so par­rots may com­mu­ni­cate in ways that are closer to our own than, say, a fish.

  • On another note, Stephan’s neigh­bor, a mid­dle aged nurse who lives alone and who often tries to enter­tain us with bor­ing sto­ries, once tried to show me a pic­ture that her sis­ter sent to her via cell phone of Cesar Mil­lan. She was so excited and was push­ing her phone to my face, “Look, look my sis­ter met the dog whis­perer, Cesar Chavez!” I didn’t know who Cesar Mil­lan was at the time, so I thought, maybe there is a pos­si­bil­ity that he shares the name with the beloved farmer and social jus­tice patri­arch. But then I thought, no way.

    her: “You’ve never heard of Cesar Chavez…??!”

    me:“well, no, I mean, I guess not.”

    .…

    Maybe ani­mals under­stand­ing our signs is us under­stand­ing each other’s chore­og­ra­phy. And we can under­stand chore­og­ra­phy across species if we try because of cause and effect, but for some rea­son, sounds are native and singular.

  • So when a bull­dog learns to skate­board is it a basis for some sort of “shared lan­guage?“
    Let us sup­pose we began sniff­ing each other’s butts. What would the bull­dog think?
    Let us not for­get that language/communication is, on the most basic of lev­els, a trans­fer­ence of mean­ing. A skate­board­ing bull­dog is not, I would sug­gest, com­mu­ni­cat­ing a sub­scrip­tion to any spe­cific cul­ture or niche. The bull­dog is not express­ing a desire to iden­tify with or uti­lize the tools of trans­porta­tion, enter­tain­ment or ath­leti­cism just as the bull­dog does not use a dog bowl because it likes a clean house. This is not to say that the bull­dog does not com­pre­hend the skate­board or the abil­ity to skate­board as a tool. On the con­trary, I would posit that he/she, and all other “ani­mals” for that mat­ter, are fully aware, at least in some capac­ity, of mechan­i­cal evo­lu­tion and com­mu­ni­ca­tion is noth­ing if not mechan­i­cal. This is evi­denced by the fact that I am writ­ing this ‘through’ the inter­net: the lat­est means of com­mu­ni­cat­ing; a trans­fer­ence of mean­ing uti­liz­ing the least amount of energy.
    So what then is hap­pen­ing when the bull­dog, who’s named Tyson by the way, learns to ride a skate­board? Is it mim­icry or is it some­thing else? Is it play? If so, does a bulldog’s per­cep­tion of such an activ­ity have sim­i­lar­i­ties to our own? Does Tyson uti­lize play as a means to learn through inter­ac­tions with its envi­ron­ment?
    A dog is on the plane. In the dis­tance a rab­bit leaps out of a hole, unaware of the dog’s pres­ence. The unlucky rab­bit is spot­ted and the dog bolts after it, catches the prey, and kills it. This is instinct, known due to mil­lions of years of evo­lu­tion of both hunt­ing and com­mu­ni­cat­ing hunt­ing tech­niques to off­spring.
    A boy and a dog are in the park. The boy throws a ball and the dog retrieves it. This is play; a prac­tice made use­ful for and by the instinct to catch flee­ing prey. Once the dog learns to asso­ciate an inan­i­mate object (ball, stick, dad’s shoe) with prey and, hence, learns by asso­ci­a­tion (I.e. a trans­fer­ence of mean­ing) could we not say this is a form of com­mu­ni­cat­ing with the boy, it’s pack, a desire to hunt, feed, and sur­vive?
    Things get jum­bled I’m sure. I mean, though I did ref­er­ence the inter­net as the lat­est exam­ple of the evo­lu­tion of com­mu­ni­ca­tion (based on its lack of resource con­sump­tion, at least locally), you are sit­ting right next to me on this couch.
    Damnit Alisha! What are you try­ing to com­mu­ni­cate with your blog? Or are you play­ing? Am I play­ing too? Why can’t we actu­ally talk about this like peo­ple with mouths and func­tion­ing tongues? Can you smell my feet from where you’re sitting?

  • hi alisha, thanks for keep­ing this going. i like the idea of ani­mals as aliens… in our own homes.

Leave a Reply